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This paper aims at showing that the disconnection between formal structures and 
theoretical content in economic model building could lead to undesirable consequences. In this 
sense, linking formal and verbal contents by means of coherent and relevant interpretations is 
worth the effort. For it is a relatively simple way of helping to improve the usefulness of 
mathematical economic theorization. By way of illustration of these ideas, the paper discusses 
the interpretation which Arrow and Debreu themselves put on the inclusion of free goods in 
their proof of existence of a general equilibrium. 
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 1. Introduction 
 The application of mathematical techniques to the analysis of economic problems is a 
methodological possibility. During the last sixty years, this methodological option has been 
linked to the history of a significant part of economic theory. Particularly, in theoretical model 
building, mathematical techniques are a basic tool used in order to link theoretical models’ 
assumptions to their conclusions. In accordance with this situation, the term mathematization 
will be used in this paper to make reference to “a methodology which requires that all 
arguments be expressed, or at least expressible, in mathematics” (Chick and Dow, 2001, p. 
705)2. 
 This process of mathematization has brought about important benefits (see, e. g., 
Backhouse (1997, ch. 10), and Katzner (2003, pp. 565-567)). Particularly, it has given economic 
analysis “greater logical solidity” (Debreu, 1991, p. 3). Nevertheless, the implementation of this 
methodological option has produced important modifications in the nature of economic analysis 
itself. In this regard the way in which the mathematization of economics has often been put into 
                                                          
2 For a deeper discussion of the meaning of the term mathematization -and its relation to the 
concepts of formalization and axiomatization- see Backhouse (1998, pp. 1848-1850), and Chick (1998, 
pp. 1859-1861). 
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practice implies a new order of priorities. According to this order, the use of mathematics 
becomes, from a methodological view, an end in itself. This does not mean that mathematical 
economics bears no relation to economic reality. However, it implies that economists have 
accepted that the construction of economic analysis -even when its relation to economic reality 
or economic intuition is not too solid- is methodologically correct if formal or mathematical 
criteria of deductive reasoning are satisfied. That is, standard practice in mathematical 
economics suggests that, in case of conflict, there is no problem in considering the formal rigor3 
and clarity which the use of mathematics gives to economic arguments as more important aims 
than other methodological goals such as describing or explaining economic life’s real workings 
or linking theorization to empirical evidence4. 
Leaving aside this coflict between mathematical economics and the realism of its 
constructions, one of the consequences which stems from the status of mathematization as an 
end in itself is that the economic content of a formal model or its possible interpretations are 
secondary to the building of a mathematically correct formal structure5 (Chick, 1998, p. 1865). 
                                                          
3 For the different ways in which the notion of rigor can be defined, see Davidson (2003), Dow 
(2003), and Weintraub (1998, and 2002). 
4 In this sense, Rosenberg (1994, p. 230) states that “the mystery surrounding the actual 
development of economic theory -its shifts in formalism, its insulation from empirical assessment, its 
interest in proving purely formal, abstract possibilities ... - can be comprehended and properly appreciated 
if we give up on the notion that economics any longer has the aims or makes the claims of an empirical 
science of human behaviour. Rather we should view it as a branch of mathematics”. The list of authors 
who have pointed out methodological problems associated with the mathematization of economics is very 
long. Some relevant works are Blaug (1999), Chick (1998), Chick and Dow (2001), Clower (1994 and 
1995), Coates (1996), Coddington (1975), Comim (2000, and 2002), Davidson (2003), Davis (1999), 
Dow (2003), Hausman (1981, pp. 28ff.), Hutchison (1994, pp. 289ff., and 1999, pp. 250ff.), or Katzner 
(2002, and 2003).  
5 Following Gibbard and Varian (1978, p. 666), the term formal structure of an economic model 
-or theory in the strict sense- makes reference to the set formed by that model’s formal assumptions, the 
theorems which follow from such assumptions, and the mathematical and logical developments which 
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In this sense, Debreu -taking into consideration that he “appears to equate mathematisation and 
axiomatisation” (Backhouse, 1998, p. 1849n)- establishes in the preface of Theory of Value (p. 
VIII) that the axiomatization of economic theory is based on the principle that theory in the 
strict sense and interpretations are logically disconnected. Moreover, the former is autonomous. 
Indeed, in “Theoretic Models”, Debreu (1986, p. 1265) explicitly states that “an axiomatized 
theory has a mathematical form that is completely separated from its economic content. If one 
removes the economic interpretation of the primitive concepts, of the assumptions, and of the 
conclusions of the model, its bare mathematical structure must still stand”. 
The usefulness of disassociating formal theory from its interpretations, however, has not 
been underlined only by Debreu. As Vilks (1999, p. 158) points out, “this distinction can be 
found, more or less explicitly, in many if not most contributions to mathematical economics 
after Theory of Value”. 
To illustrate the principle established in the Theory of Value, Debreu mentions how 
Arrow modified the interpretation of the concept of commodity when he added to the traditional 
characteristics which define a commodity the state of the world in which it will be available. 
However, the postulated separation between formal structure and interpretation could be 
sidestepping, on occasion, the difficulties in giving economic content to formal contributions. In 
this sense, note that the above quoted principle, instead of stating that economic content must 
precede and be the basis of the formal structure which expresses it, proposes the reverse order. 
That is, this principle legitimizes a situation in which the first and fundamental step in the 
construction of a model is given by the elaboration of its formal structure, regardless of the fact 
that the interpretation later provided could lack coherence or relevance -i.e., “immediate 
practical impact” (Leontief, 1971, p. 1)- and without even having any guarantee that the formal 
structure can be interpreted at all. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
connect deductively those theorems with the assumptions. According to this paper’s point of view, the 
concept of model includes both the model’s formal structure and its interpretation(s). The notion of 
interpretation will be defined in the next section. 
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This paper’s aim is to discuss how and why taking the disconnection between formal 
structures and interpretations as a methodological starting point for model building could 
sometimes lead to undesirable and unexpected consequences. In addition, its objective is to 
show that linking formal and verbal contents by means of coherent and relevant interpretations 
is worth the effort. For it is a relatively simple way of helping to improve the methodological 
legitimacy of mathematical economic theorization. To illustrate such aims, part of the 
argumentation will be focused on a particular problem concerning the proof of existence of 
general competitive equilibrium (PEGE) provided by Arrow and Debreu (1954) (AD); namely, 
the way in which these authors interpreted the introduction of free goods in general equilibrium 
analysis. 
 Three reasons justify the choice of AD’s (1954) model as a case-study. First, AD 
provided an interpretation of the formal aspects of their model. Second, their interpretation is 
problematic in a sense which makes the discussion of this model particularly illustrative of this 
paper’s aims. Third, this model has an undeniable relevance in the history of formal economic 
analysis.  
Nevertheless, before we proceed, it might be advisable to emphasize that this paper 
concerns itself with interpretations and aim at suggesting a simple condition which could 
contribute to the improvement of mathematical economics. Accordingly, the concrete model 
which AD (1954) built is taken into consideration, on the one hand, for the purpose of showing 
that this paper’s conclusions are not just a priori statements, but are based on the way in which 
the development of economic analysis takes place. On the other hand, the free-goods problem in 
AD’s (1954) model is discussed for illustrative purposes; that is, for the aim of illustrating how 
a particular formal structure and its interpretations interacts. This means that this paper is not 
interested, for example, in the realistic/unrealistic nature of AD’s (1954) model. But in the 
consequences which might stem from the problematic nature of its interpretations. In addition, it 
means that this paper will not discuss analytical possibilities which were not considered by AD 
(1954) -for instance, how free goods would be affected if monotonic preferences were assumed 
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or if negative prices were possible in order to analyze the specific problems posed by the 
interpretations of this model’s formal structure6. 
In this sense, every single formal structure has its own interpretative solutions and 
problems. There is no sense, therefore, in asserting that the interpretative problems of a specific 
model are not worthy of consideration because there exists a previous, contemporary or later 
model which adopts a different analytical approach to the same subject. Hence, inquiring, for 
instance, how the particular formal structure of a model like AD’s (1954) model can be 
interpreted is itself a relevant question. There would be no point in the attempt to dispute its 
relevance by arguing, for example, that AD (1954) could have assumed a different approach. In 
short, previous formal structures will be modified, improved and even superseded by other 
formal structures. Nevertheless, using this argument to discredit the methodological conclusions 
which stem from a discussion about the difficulty in interpreting a formal structure which is a 
landmark in the history of economic analysis implies, implicitly, that we have to be ready to 
accept that discussing either the interpretative or analytical problems of any contemporary 
formal structure becomes superfluous. For, in the future, there will always be a different formal 
structure which will propose an alternative analytical view. 
For a suitable discussion of these aims, this paper has been divided into three sections. 
In Section 1, the concept of interpretation is defined. In Section 2, the problematic relation 
between interpretations and formal structures in model building is illustrated by analyzing the 
inclusion of free goods in AD’s (1954) proof of existence. The concluding section draws the 
paper to a close by stressing the main implications which can be drawn from the fact that a 
certain part of the mathematization of theoretical economics is carried out, implicitly or 
explicitly, on the basis that mathematical reasoning is not subject to economic content.  
                                                          
6 A contemporary paper of AD (1954) which assumes monotonic preferences is, for example, 
Nikaidô (1956). As regards negative equilibrium prices, after the publication of AD (1954), subsequent 
theoretical developments introduced this possibility. One of the ways in which such a possibility has been 
put forward assumes that the set of prices, instead of being the unit simplex, is either the closed unit ball 
or the unit sphere. See, for example, Bergstrom (1976), Debreu (1956), and Hart and Kuhn (1975). 
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2. The meaning of interpretation 
 Following Gibbard and Varian’s concept of story, the notion of interpretations of a 
model’s formal structure will be defined as the set of verbal argumentations and definitions 
which try to give economic verbal content to that model’s formal variables, assumptions, 
deductions, and theorems. To illustrate it with an extremely simple example: by means of its 
interpretation, we can go from the formal expression yj = (yy1, -yj2, ... , -yjl), where yy1 = F(yj2, ... 
, yjl),  to deal with a firm which would be using certain quantities of production factors to 
produce efficiently a certain amount of output. 
 Rubinstein (1991, p. 909) has defined interpretation as “a mapping which links a formal 
theory with everyday language”. However, this definition is, in a certain sense, too restrictive. 
For, besides interpretations which are based on everyday language, there are interpretations 
which express the verbal content of a formal structure by means of the technical language 
provided by economic theory. In fact, the main aspect concerning interpretations is not the kind 
of language in which they are expressed; but the fact that they give verbal content to formal 
structures by making use of economic theory in a non-strict sense (following Debreu’s 
terminology), arguments which are supposed to be intuitively evident, or common sense. 
Indeed, we should not lose sight of the fact that the reverse is often true too; i.e., many 
contributions to formal economic theory have their roots in economic intuition, common sense, 
and ordinary logic (see, e.g., Chick and Dow (2001); Coates (1996); Comim (2000, and 2002); 
and Davis (1999)).  
Accordingly, in our view, interpretations involve an attempt to justify, by making use of 
non-formal economic theory, economic intuition or common sense, why a certain formal 
element is introduced in a model. This does not imply that, once interpreted, it becomes true in 
some sense, empirically correct, or necessarily acceptable. At best, what it means is that, 
without the justification provided by the corresponding interpretation, that formal element is 
flatly unacceptable -or that its only justification is a mathematical need lacking economic 
content. By of way of illustration, consider the formal assumption that consumer’s preferences 
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are strictly convex. This formal assumption can be viewed, in everyday language, as the formal 
expression of a basic inclination of agents for diversity; that is, the expression of people’s 
preference for balanced consumption plans, as opposed to plans which are made up of large 
amounts of a few goods and very small quantities of the rest of them. But it can also be 
interpreted technically, i.e., in terms of economic theory. Particularly, the strict convexity 
assumption can be given economic verbal content by means of the concept of diminishing 
marginal rate of substitution. 
However, even if this assumption is interpretable in both ways, it is still, as Cornwall 
(1984, p. 35), for instance, has suggested, a “somewhat restrictive” condition placed on agents’ 
preferences. Therefore, mathematical or analytical needs apart, there is no room for stating that 
it is either true or necessarily acceptable in order to understand agents’ behavior. Nevertheless, 
at the same time, given that it is interpretable, we have arguments -non-mathematical 
arguments- which help to justify why strict convexity can be assumed in the theory of consumer 
behavior. At least, to say it more prosaically, transmitting the economic knowledge implicit in 
mathematical models to, for instance, students of economic theory would be easier if formal 
structures were coherently interpretable. That is, non-mathematical explanations do not make 
assumptions true or realistic, but help to justify why we assume what we assume.  
But why is interpretation important as far as economic modelization is concerned? 
Other reasons apart, the answer to this question, once again, has its roots in the fact that 
empirical criteria do not normally play a definitive role in relation to the problem of theory 
selection in actual economics (see, for instance, Hands (1984, p. 59)). Given this situation, an 
ideal solution to improve the methodological status of economic theorization would be to 
propose that any economic model which is not empirically testable or does not satisfy the 
empirical criteria which have been agreed should be unacceptable. Thus, most of the 
interpretative problems concerning the mathematization of economics would probably vanish. 
Nevertheless, this kind of solution is sort of unrealistic. For it is based on the belief that things 
can be improved much more than what seems possible.  
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Probably, these are the reasons why different authors have tried to establish the 
usefulness of economic theoretical models on a different basis. In this sense, according to 
Hausman (1992), economic models would be useful for “conceptual exploration” (see, also, 
Backhouse (1999, p. 297)). Other authors have not resigned themselves to the fact that the 
usefulness of economic models is only conceptual exploration, and have proposed a way of 
understanding them which attempts to bridge the gap between modelization and the aims of 
explaining and describing economic reality. In this spirit, assuming that many models are 
theoretical constructions which would not stand rigorous empirical testing, Gibbard and Varian 
(1978), for instance, have stated that they could be considered “caricatures of economic reality”. 
More recently, Sugden (2000) have described them as “credible worlds”.  
But the point is that the statement that economic modelization is useful in any of these 
senses would be underpinned if formal structures were coherently interpretable. Otherwise, we 
would run the risk of building mathematical constructions which lack relevant, coherent or just 
articulated verbal content. In  other words, we would have accepted a flaw which can be 
avoided in order to improve economic models’ usefulness, whether for conceptual exploration, 
for drawing caricatures of economic reality, for the creation of credible worlds, or just for the 
process of thinking economically. 
In order to illustrate these ideas, the significance of interpreting formal structures will be 
analyzed below by means of interpretations provided by economic theory itself. These 
interpretations, as far as AD’s (1954) formal structure is concerned, follow the interpretative 
criterion which Davis mentions in relation to the Theory of Value; i.e., regarding this book 
“interpretation can never be more than an illustration of the logic of his [of Debreu’s] 
assumptions on production and consumption sets and maximization behavior” (1999, p. 506). 
The problem, nevertheless, is that following this interpretative criterion -as the interpretations 
considered do- does not provide a coherent interpretation of AD’s (1954) formal structure. That 
is, as a result of the disconnection between formal and economic content, this formal structure 
cannot be coherently interpreted even in terms of AD’s own logic of maximizing agents. 
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3. Mathematical needs and economic interpretations: by way of example. 
PEGEs are, if not “the crowning achievement of mathematical economics” (Rosenberg 
1994, p. 229), one of its most outstanding achievements. Far from the scarcely rigorous 
procedure of counting equations and unknowns -which had already been questioned by Neisser 
and Stackelberg at the beginning of the 1930s- PEGEs establish the set of conditions which 
guarantee, in mathematical terms, that the interaction of a great number of agents who decide 
independently and autonomously gives rise to a state of equilibrium in which every agent, given 
the available resources, maximizes his/her aims. 
Although Wald had already provided a PEGE at the beginning of the 1930s (see, e.g., 
Arrow and Debreu (1954, pp. 60-61), Arrow and Hahn (1971, pp. 8-9), Wald, (1951 [1936]), 
and Weintraub (1983, pp. 3-12)), AD’s paper “Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive 
Economy” is usually considered the beginning of “the contemporary phase of development [as 
regards PEGE]” (Debreu, 1986, p. 1268). In a similar sense, Weintraub  (2002, p. 183) asserts 
that “economists with even scant knowledge of the history of economics can identify Kenneth 
Arrow and Gerard Debreu’s (1954) Econometrica paper as having provided the proof that 
settled the issue [of PEGE]”. 
In this paper, AD model a competitive economy in which there are a finite number of 
commodities, l, of production units, n, and of consumers, m, which are denoted by the letters h, j 
and i, respectively. On the basis provided by the assumptions which AD (1954, pp. 267-70) 
make in relation to producers and consumers, they establish theorem I, which asserts the 
existence of general equilibrium. According to their definition, and taking into consideration 
that xi and yj are, respectively, a possible consumption plan of the ith consumption unit and a 
possible production plan of the jth production unit, a general equilibrium is a set of vectors (x*1, 
... , x*m, y*1, ... , y*n, p*) which satisfy the following four conditions: 
“1. y*j maximizes p* · yj over the set Yj, for each j .... 
 “2. x*i maximizes ui(xi) over the set {xi/ xi Є Xi, p* · xi ≦ p* · ζi + ∑nj=1 αij · p* · y*j} .... 
 “3. p* Є P = {p/ p Є Rl, p ≧ 0, ∑lh=1 ph = 1} .... 
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“4. z* ≦ 0, p* · z* = 0” (1954, pp. 268-71), 
where P ⊂ Rl is the set of prices; p Є P is a l-dimensional price vector; Yj ⊂ Rl is the set 
of possible production plans; p · yj is the profit made by the jth production unit if, at prices p, it 
chooses the production plan yj; ui(xi) is the utility function of the ith consumer; ζi Є Rl is the 
vector of initial holdings of the ith consumer; αij is the share of the ith consumer in the profit of 
the jth production unit; p · xi ≦ p · ζi + ∑nj=1 αij · p · yj is the set of vectors which satisfy the 
budget restraint at prices p; z Є Rl is a vector whose components denote the excess of demand 
over supply on each of the l markets; 0 is a l-dimensional vector whose components are zero; 
asterisks denote equilibrium quantities; and x ≧ x’ means that, for every component h of such 
vectors, xh ≧ x’h. 
 The fourth of the above conditions (C4) implies that, “for some commodity h ..., either 
z*h = 0 or z*h < 0 and p*h = 0” (AD, 1954, pp. 271-272); that is, at equilibrium, supply equals 
demand on all markets, with the exceptions of markets for free goods7, in which supply, at a 
zero equilibrium price, exceeds demand. 
As regards our aims, the question lies in determining why AD’s (1954) proof of 
existence needs a definition of general equilibrium which -following the line opened by Wald- 
takes free goods into consideration. In other words, why the condition C4 does not restrict the 
definition of general equilibrium -according to what can be considered the usual convention in 
standard economic theory- to those situations in which demand for all commodities equals 
supply. In this regard, note that later theoretical developments have been focused on the 
construction of PEGEs which either minimize the effects of free goods on the definition of 
equilibrium by assuming free disposal or do not take them into consideration at all (see, e.g., 
Bergstrom (1976), or Debreu (1959)). 
 
                                                          
7 A free good is a useful but a not scarce good, such that, at equilibrium, the supply of it exceeds 
its demand, and its price -in the sense of  social opportunity cost- is zero. 
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 Mathematical needs. 
 In order to proof Theorem I, AD (1954) make use of an economy whose particular form 
is the following one: “E = [X1, ... , Xm, Y1, ... , Yn, P,  u1(x1), ... , um(xm), p · y1, ... , p · yn, p · z, 
A1(x’1), ... , Am(x’m), Y1, ... , Yn, P]” (1954, p. 274), where Ai(x’i) is the budget constraint of the 
ith consumer, and p · z = ∑lh=1 ph · zh is the pay-off function of an agent named the market 
participant -to which we will return below. 
The conditions required in order to guarantee the existence of general equilibrium in 
this economy are based on a lemma (see AD (1954, p. 274)) which extends to an abstract 
economy the theorem of existence of an equilibrium point in n-person games put forward by 
Nash (1950). Both this theorem and the lemma are founded on the generalization of Brower’s 
fixed point theorem carried out by Kakutani (see Debreu (1982, pp. 698-701), and Weintraub 
(1983, pp. 24-5)). One of these conditions8 is that the set of possible price vectors, P, must be 
closed, bounded, convex, and non-empty. To satisfy this requirement, AD (1954) chose the 
following mathematical possibility (for other possibilities, see n. 5): on the basis of the 
homogeneity of degree zero in prices of the excess demand function, P is considered to be given 
by the l-1-dimensional closed unit simplex; that is, possible price vectors are those whose l 
components add to one and are non-negative. Thus, P is defined in the following way: P = {p/ p 
Є Rl, p ≧ 0, ∑lh=1 ph = 1}, which is the third formal condition (C3) that characterizes AD’s 
(1954) definition of general equilibrium 
The condition C3 guarantees that the set of possible price vectors satisfies, in particular, 
the requirement of being a closed set. However, it does so at the cost of accepting the possibility 
that, at equilibrium, some prices can be zero. Moreover, a possible equilibrium price vector 
                                                          
8 The conditions required for the existence of a general equilibrium are the following ones -with i 
= 1, ... , m, and j = 1, ... , n: (1) Xi, Yj and P must be compact and convex sets; (2) ui(xi), p · yj and p · z 
must be continuous and quasi-concave functions; (3) Yj and P must be continuous and non-empty; (4) 
Ai(x’i) must be a continuous function whose graph is a closed set, and for every x’i, the set Ai(x’i) must be 
convex and non-empty. 
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could be one which involves that all prices but one are zero. This possibility, however, would be 
problematic unless the presence of free goods is accepted. For scarce commodities cannot have, 
by definition, zero equilibrium prices. Accordingly, once AD (1954) open the possibility that 
some prices can be zero, they add that, if a commodity’s equilibrium price were zero, this 
commodity would be a free good. As regards this kind of commodities, taking into 
consideration that AD (1954) do not accept negative prices, the law of supply and demand 
would not clear their markets: at a zero equilibrium price, supply exceeds demand on these 
markets. Expressed in terms of the model’s formal structure: from “4. z* ≦ 0, p* · z* = 0”  the 
consequence is drawn that “z*h < 0 for some commodity h is possible, but only if p*h = 0” (AD, 
1954, p. 271). 
Thus, it could be stated, with Blaug (1999, p. 275), that “formalism always solves the 
problems it itself creates”: in order to satisfy the formal condition which requires the set of 
possible prices to be closed, AD (1954) assumed that prices could be zero. This, also, provoked 
a new problem, whose solution was achieved just by qualifying the idea that economics deals 
with scarce goods; i.e., to solve this new problem, AD resorted to free goods. They even 
accepted that, according to C3 and C4, a possible general equilibrium is given by a situation 
which implies that all commodities of the economy but one are free goods9.  
 
Economic interpretations. 
In the preceding section, continuous references have been made to concepts such as 
price, commodity or demand. Without these references, we could say that analytical economics 
is just a branch of applied mathematics (see Blaug (1999, p. 276), Clower (1995, pp. 311-316), 
Hands (1984, p. 65), or Rosenberg (1994, p. 230)). Besides these references, the preceding 
section has shown how the need to solve a mathematical problem -namely, satisfying the 
                                                          
9 As regards the argument which states that the inclusion of free goods in PEGEs can be justified 
by stating that whether the scarce or free nature of goods cannot be assumed, but is discovered by market 
forces, see below. 
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requirements of Kakutani’s theorem- gave rise to an incompatibility with the economic concept 
of scarcity. This incompatibility becomes apparent in the fact that AD (1954) included free 
goods in their model. In this regard, the inclusion of free goods has been referred to as a 
theoretical improvement (see, e. g., Arrow and Hahn (1971, p. 22)). But, as we have already 
mentioned, later models have constructed proofs of existence which either exclude free goods or 
minimize their effects on the definition of equilibrium -even at the cost of assuming free 
disposal. 
If this were the whole story, we could conclude that defining general equilibrium in a 
way in which supply can exceed demand at equilibrium would be an ad hoc strategy -in the 
sense which Hands (1988, p. 132) mentions: “for economist theorists, the sin of ad hocness 
seems to be infidelity to the metaphysical presuppositions of the neoclassical program rather 
than face-saving adjustments in response to recalcitrant data”. That is, we would have an ad hoc 
manoeuvre if the way in which concepts are normally used in economic theory is modified in 
order to guarantee that, mathematically, everything is correct. 
Nevertheless, AD (1954) provided an economic interpretation which tried to justify why 
their definition of general equilibrium includes free goods. The question is therefore to appraise 
this interpretation. 
This interpretation is based on adding to consumers and producers a third type of agent, 
named the market participant. In particular, showing the compatibility between the condition 
C4 and the market participant’s behavior AD (1954) provide an interpretation of the inclusion 
of free goods in their PEGE based on this agent’s behavior and the law of supply and demand10. 
                                                          
10 It is advisable to make a brief comment regarding the way in which AD (1954) use the market 
participant in order to interpret the inclusion of free goods in their proof of existence. When the condition 
C4 is introduced, in Section 1.4.1. of AD (1954), it is directly interpreted in terms of the “dynamic picture 
of the classical ‘law of supply and demand’” (1954, p. 271). The market participant makes his/her 
appearance in Section 3. In particular, in Section 3.1.1., the form of the pay-off function of the market 
participant is justified, too, in terms of “the classical ‘law of supply and demand’” (AD, p. 275). As these 
quotations show, the connection between the arguments in Section 1.4.1 and Section 3.1.1. is very close. 
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This agent’s aim is to maximize his/her pay-off function, p · z11. To achieve this goal, 
AD (1954, pp. 274-275) assume that “the market participant does not maximize instantaneously 
[the function p · z] but, taking other participants’ choices as given, adjusts his choice of prices 
so as to increase his pay-off”. That is, taking z as given, the market participant would maximize 
his/her pay-off function by modifying p Є P. Therefore, his/her behavior would be given by a 
norm which, according to AD (1954, p. 275), would fit “the classical ‘law of supply and 
demand’”: “For given z, p · z is a linear function of p; it can be increased by increasing ph for 
those commodities for which zh > 0, decreasing ph if zh < 0 (provided ph is not already 0)”. 
As a result, for a particular value of the excess demands, z0, the market participant’s 
behavior would consist in solving the following optimization problem: 
Max. p · z0, with p Є P. 
If excess demands -“taking other participants’ choices as given”- are at their equilibrium 
level -i. e., z0 = z*- then the solution of the problem above would be the equilibrium price 
vector, p*: 
Max. p · z* = p* · z*, with z0 = z* and p Є P. 
 Expressed in a different way: 
p* · z* ≧ p · z*, with p Є P. 
 If this expression is combined with Walras’ Law -namely, p · z = 0 (see AD (1954, pp. 
272 and 275)- the following inequality could be stated:  
                                                                                                                                                                          
So much so that AD, just after their reference to the law of supply and demand in the latter Section, 
recommend to consider again what they had stated as regards this law in the former Section. 
Nevertheless, besides the “intuitive comments” which AD make in relation to the pay-off function of the 
market participant in Section 3.1.1., they assert that the justification of the form of the pay-off function of 
the market participant is to be found in Section 3.2. In this Section, by showing the compatibility between 
the condition C4 and the market participant’s behavior, AD provide an interpretation of the inclusion of 
free goods in their PEGE based on this agent’s behavior. This interpretation is discussed below. 
11 The conception of the market as a maximizer agent had already been put forward, mutatis 
mutandis, by Debreu (1951, p. 288). Nikaidô (1956), too, based his PEGE on a very similar idea. 
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“0 = p* · z* ≧ δh · z* = z*h” (AD, 1954, p. 276), 
where δh Є P is a price vector “in which every component is 0, except the hth, which is 
1” (1954, p. 276). If the value of h is modified from one to 1, the following series of inequalities 
would be obtained: 
0 = p* · z* ≧ δ1 · z* = z*1 
0 = p* · z* ≧ δ2 · z* = z*2 
... 
0 = p* · z* ≧ δl · z* = z*l. 
 From these inequalities, the following conclusion is drawn: 
“z* ≦ 0” (AD, 1954, p. 276). 
 That is, at equilibrium, the value of the excess demand can be zero or negative. This 
conclusion, besides Walras’ Law, involves that, if p*h = 0, then, z*h < 0. 
 Thus, the behavior of the market participant provides an interpretation of the formal 
condition C412. In particular, given that AD (1954) state that this economic agent’s behavior fits 
the law of supply and demand in competitive economies, the presence of free goods in general 
equilibrium could be interpreted -and, therefore, explained and justified- in terms of this law. 
Consequently, C4 would not only be one of the formal elements on which AD’s (1954) proof of 
                                                          
12 Note that this interpretation is just the result of combining two ideas. On the one hand, the 
intuitive statement that “the market participant does not maximize instantaneously [the function p · z] but, 
taking other participants’ choices as given, adjusts his choice of prices so as to increase his pay-off” (AD 
1954, pp. 274-5). On the other hand, the fact that, given a certain value of the excess demands, z0, the 
problem Max. p · z0, with p Є P, synthesizes the market participant’s behavior. In other words, the 
interpretation of C4 is based on the idea that, once consumers and producers choose their consumption 
and production plans respectively, we would have the excess demand vector, z0, which gives the market 
participant the opportunity for maximizing the function p · z0. 
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existence is based. In addition, it would be interpretable, by means of the market participant, 
according to one of the most widely accepted theoretical ideas in economics. 
 Nevertheless, the expounded interpretation is untenable. But the cause is not that it is 
empirically false, excessively abstract or fictitious. It is untenable in relation to certain 
fundamental aspects of the formal structure of AD’s (1954) model itself. In particular, the 
problem stems from the fact that there is a contradiction between, on the hand, the way in which 
AD interprets the formal implications of the first two conditions which define general 
equilibrium (C1 and C2), and, on the other hand, the interpretation of C4 and its implications. 
According to C1 -namely, y*j maximizes p* · yj over the set Yj, for each j- a certain 
producer’s behavior would consist in choosing the production plan(s) which, “taking prices as 
given” (AD, 1954, p. 268), maximize(s) his/her profits. In addition, in accordance with C2 -
namely, x*i maximizes ui(xi) over the set {xi/ xi Є Xi, p* · xi ≦ p* · ζi + ∑nj=1 αij · p* · y*j}- the 
consumer’s problem is to choose the consumption vector(s) which maximize(s) his/her utility 
function and “whose cost at market prices does not exceed the individual’s income” (AD, 1954, 
p. 270). Therefore, from C1 and C2, AD (1954, p. 271) draw the following conclusion: “the 
supply and demand for all commodities is determined as a function of p (not necessarily single 
valued) if we vary p and at the same time instruct each production and consumption unit to 
behave as if the announced value of p were the equilibrium value”. 
That is, given that individual demand and supply functions depend on prices, such 
functions will only have concrete values when we have a particular price vector. However, the 
problems of how prices are established and how the price system co-ordinates agents’ actions in 
a competitive economy remain unresolved in economic terms. For “the assumption of perfect 
competition ... left no room for any actual agent to change price” (Hahn, 1982, p. 745). To solve 
these problems AD (1954) make use of a recurrent interpretation in the neo-Walrasian tradition, 
i.e., they assume the existence of a being to which we will refer by the well-known concept of 
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Walrasian auctioneer13. This auctioneer announces a price vector so that consumers and 
producers, given their demand and supply functions, calculate their consumption and production 
plans under such prices. If these plans were not an equilibrium allocation, economic agents 
would not carry out their plans and the auctioneer would modify prices again in order to 
influence economic agents’ supply and demand decisions. 
Note that the previous reasoning, which involves a dynamic process of tâtonnement, has 
value only as a verbal interpretation of the formal structure of AD’s (1954) model, which is a 
static model whose equilibrium is found by solving a set of simultaneous equations. Indeed, 
right at the beginning of their paper, AD (1954, p. 266) state clearly that they are not concerned 
with investigating the stability of equilibrium, a study which “would require specification of the 
dynamics of a competitive market”. However, at the same time, in order to provide an 
interpretation of their static formal structure, AD themselves use dynamic arguments. First, 
when they refer to the process of tâtonnement which has just been mentioned (AD, 1954, p. 
271). Second, when, in relation to the market participant’s behavior, they state that “the market 
participant does not maximize instantaneously...” (AD, 1954, p. 275). Third, when they talk 
about “the dynamic picture of the classical ‘law of supply and demand’” (AD, 1954, p. 271). 
Accordingly, the fact that AD’s paper does not investigate the problem of stability of 
equilibrium bears no relation to the fact that they use dynamic verbal arguments to interpret 
their static formal structure. 
Once the Walrasian auctioneer has been introduced in the interpretation of the formal 
structure of AD’s (1954) model, we can go on to argue in terms of the excess demand function. 
Given the way in which this function is constructed, C1 and C2 imply that the excess demand 
function depends on prices too: 
z(p) = ∑mi=1 xi(p) - ∑nj=1 yj(p) - ∑mi=1 · ζi. 
                                                          
13 AD (1954) do not mention explicitly the Walrasian auctioneer. However, as the quotation 
above shows, they are implicitly referring to him/her when they describe the process of tâtonnement: “...if 
we vary p and at the same time instruct each production and consumption unit to behave as if the 
announced value of p were the equilibrium value”. 
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Therefore, prices are the exogenous variable of the system of simultaneous equations 
composed of the excess demand functions of each of the markets. When interpreting this formal 
consequence, the task of modifying this independent variable is delegated to the Walrasian 
auctioneer, assuming that, by means of the process of tâtonnement, a general equilibrium will be 
achieved. In this sense, the auctioneer has been widely accepted in the neo-Walrasian tradition 
as an interpretative keystone of competitive markets because his/her behavior corresponds to the 
law of supply and demand: if the demand for (supply of) a commodity exceeds supply 
(demand), the auctioneer would rise (lower) the price of that commodity. But it would behave 
this way in order to decrease the value of the excess demand (supply). That is, if Giffen goods 
are excluded, the price of a commodity and the excess demand for it are mutually and inversely 
related. Thus, if at ph the excess demand for the commodity h is zh, and at p’h it is z’h, then, in 
the case that ph were lower than p’h, we would have that zh is higher than z’h, and so we could 
not conclude, a priori, whether ph · zh is higher or lower than p’h · z’h. As a result, the following 
optimization problem makes no sense as far as the Walrasian auctioneer is concerned: 
Max. p · z0, with p Є P, and z0 constant. 
Neither does the following inequality: 
p* · z* ≧ p · z*, with p Є P. 
However, as we have discussed, this inequality and this problem -which synthesize the 
market participant’s behavior- are precisely the basis of AD’s (1954) interpretation of the 
condition C4, which implies that, at equilibrium, excess demands are non-positive, z* ≦ 0. 
In summary, as regards the interpretation of the formal structure of AD (1954), it can be 
stated the following: the formal implications which stem from C1 and C2 are interpreted by AD 
in terms of the Walrasian auctioneer, but the formal condition C4 is interpreted by means of the 
market participant. However, both interpretations -regardless of the fact that AD’s (1954) model 
is impeccable from a mathematical view- are incompatible. Both the Walrasian auctioneer and 
the market participant, according to AD (1954), stand for market forces. More specifically, they 
represent the law of supply and demand in competitive economies. Nevertheless, their behaviors 
 20
are different. The auctioneer’s behavior consists in modifying prices to influence the excess 
demand for the different commodities, and his/her aim -prices being the exogenous variable- is 
to find a price vector which gives rise to an equilibrium allocation. As regards the market 
participant, his/her behavior could be described as follows: “taking other participants’ choices 
as given” -i.e., once the value of excess demands (which are the exogenous variable now) is 
determined- the market participant would modify prices with the aim of maximizing the 
function p · z; but this modification of prices –in contrast to what has been stated in relation to 
the auctioneer- would not affect the value of excess demands. 
Consequently, following the interpretations which AD (1954) provided, the workings of 
the economy can be described as a process divided in two phases. In the first stage, market 
forces  -disguised as the Walrasian auctioneer- would announce a price vector, p0, which gives 
rise to a particular excess demand vector, z0. In the second stage, those forces -now disguised as 
the market participant- would take this z0 as given and would find out the price vector, p1, which 
not only maximizes the function p · z0, but also does not cause any alteration to the value of z0. 
However, with respect to the same agents and commodities, we cannot postulate that prices 
influence excess demands and, at the same time, that excess demands remain unchanged under 
variations in prices. Put it simply, if coherence is an unavoidable value as far as economic 
interpretations are concerned, the AD’s (1954) interpretative schema is untenable because of its 
own internal contradictions. 
These contradictions are not (just) the result of using dynamic verbal arguments to 
interpret a static formal structure. Otherwise, no static model—particularly, no PEGE -could 
have ever been coherently interpreted or justified by resorting to verbal arguments like, for 
instance, the tâtonnement process or the Walrasian auctioneer. The problem is deeper. Its origin 
is to be found in the mathematical needs which led AD (1954) to assume a closed set of prices, 
P, and to include, accordingly, free goods in their proof of existence. In other words, it is not a 
problem of choosing between stability and existence. It is a problem of disconnection between 
formal and verbal contents. 
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The fact that a formal structure has not been interpreted in a coherent way does not 
imply, however, that the possibility of interpreting it coherently does not exist. In this sense, 
what we can assert in relation to AD’s (1954) model is, on the one hand, that the interpretative 
schema which they proposed is untenable, and, on the other hand, that there has not been -and 
we have not been able to conceive of- an alternative way of interpreting that model’s formal 
structure. That is, it could be said that AD’s (1954) formal structure is waiting for a coherent 
interpretation. 
Note in this regard that economic analysis has provided different interpretations 
concerning the inclusion of free goods in PEGE. For instance, Wald stated that “whether factors 
are free or scarce cannot be considered, a priori, a datum of the economy; it can only be 
determined on the basis of the production equations” (1951 [1936], p. 371). That is, according 
to this interpretation, which goods are scarce and how scarce they are become questions which 
must be solved by the system of equations which synthesizes the decisions of the individuals 
who participate in the market. But this interpretation is hardly compatible with the full-
knowledge assumption on which the decisions of the agents of AD’s (1954) model are based.  
Moreover, AD’s (1954) model, like any other theoretical model which provides a 
PEGE, aims at establishing the formal conditions under which a certain system of equations has 
a solution which is named general competitive equilibrium. Therefore, if a system of equations 
which satisfies these conditions is set out, the existence of a solution is guaranteed. However, 
the resolution of the system of equations has not discovered anything which had not been 
previously assumed -whether the scarce or free nature of the goods considered. In Katzner  
(2003, p. 565) words, “the notion that the introduction of mathematical argument would 
produce knowledge where none previously existed is specious”. 
Another example of alternative interpretation is Gale’s (1955, pp. 159-160) 
interpretation, which is based on the idea that certain processes of production generate by-
products. But this kind of interpretations cannot solve the interpretative problems of AD’s 
(1954) model. For there exists a serious obstacle to the attempt to interpret this model’s formal 
structure without the idea which underlies the market participant’s behavior—that is, the idea 
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that there exists either something or someone that, given z0, maximizes the function p · z0. In this 
sense, if we ignore this idea and make use of an argument like Gale’s one in order to interpret 
AD’s (1954) formal structure, we might be able to elaborate an interpretation which justifies 
why AD included free goods in their PEGE. However, we could not interpret an essential aspect 
of that formal structure which was closely related to the problem of free goods by these authors; 
namely, we could not interpret the role of the function p · z in their proof of existence. In this 
regard, note, first, that this function is one of the keystones on which the application of 
Kakutani’s theorem to AD’s proof was based. Second, if we ignore the idea which underlies the 
market participant’s behavior, we will probably have difficulties in interpreting the role of this 
function, because p · z  is the market participant’s pay-off function. Third, the fact that the 
market participant’s pay-off function is closely related to the free goods problem has been 
discussed above. 
In other words, in the case of AD’s (1954) model, free goods, the condition C4, the 
market participant’s behavior and his/her pay-off function are formal and interpretative aspects 
which can hardly be separated. Indeed, once AD put forward the market participant’s pay-off 
function and her behavior, their aim is to show explicitly that this fictitious agent’s pay-off 
function is consistent with C3 and C4 (see AD (1954, pp. 274-276; particularly, 3.1.1. and 
3.2.)).  But, at the same time, and as we have shown, AD’s (1954) interpretative schema of their 
formal structure is untenable. 
In conclusion, demanding -as Debreu (1959, p. VIII, and 1986, p. 1265) does- the 
autonomy of the formal structure of models with respect to their economic content involves the 
risk that, once the set of variables deductively linked by the mathematical machinery is put 
forward, we might have a formal structure which is not interpretable in a coherent way. In the 
particular case of condition C4, the analyzed interpretative problems are an example which 
shows explicitly this risk.  
AD’s (1954) model was a pioneering model which has inspired a large body of 
theoretical work. However, looking at the future, the above discussion of the interpretative 
problems of this model could help to understand some of the problems concerning the 
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methodological status of formal economic models and could cast some light on the ways to 
improve their usefulness -at an acceptable cost. In this sense, linking tightly the verbal and 
formal contents of economic models is an accessible path which could be followed in order to 
strengthen the usefulness of theoretical models, whether in Hausman’s conceptual exploration, 
or in the creation of Sugden’s credible worlds.  
As a reflection of what has just been stated, when we have mathematically faultless 
formal structures which have not been interpreted in a coherent or relevant way, the 
transmission of economic knowledge by means of those formal structures becomes much harder 
-unless we give up the idea that mathematical economics differs and must differ from 
mathematics in that the former possesses economic content. In addition, when the development 
of economic analysis is achieved through this kind of models we are giving up a very simple 
way of connecting modelization either to economic theory in a non-strict sense or to economic 
intuition. That is, we are missing an opportunity to strengthen the acceptability of modelized 
economic knowledge. 
 
4. Conclusion: the relevance of interpretations 
Many examples could be mentioned to support the assertion that a typical feature of 
neoclassical thinking is that it takes into consideration those commodities which are scarce. In 
this sense, reference can be made to Robbins’ (1949, p. 16) well-known definition of economic 
science, or to Walras’ (1954 [1874], p. 65) statement that the object of economics is “the social 
wealth”—i.e., “all things, material or immaterial ... that are scarce”. However, Menger deserves 
to be specially mentioned; because AD (1954, p. 272n) refer to him when they discuss the 
inclusion of free goods in their definition of general equilibrium According to Menger (1950 
[1871], p. 99), as regards those goods whose available quantity exceeds the amount necessary to 
satisfy human needs -i.e., non-economic goods- economic activity is excluded.  
However, AD (1954) -as Schlesinger and Wald did before- broke with the idea that the 
goods which deserve to be analyzed are only scarce goods. This break, in itself, is not negative. 
As a matter of fact, scientific development often happens as a consequence of a shift in a firmly 
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held (up to that moment) conception. In this regard, encompassing the case of free goods as well 
as the case of scarce goods could be considered, in principle, a theoretical improvement. 
Nevertheless, this consideration seems to be contradicted by the fact later analytical 
developments have been focused on the construction of PEGEs which either exclude free goods 
or minimize their effects on the definition of equilibrium. 
Whether a theoretical improvement or not, free goods were introduced in AD’s (1954) 
model in order to satisfy the mathematical conditions required by Kakutani’s theorem. Thus, 
although Debreu (1986, p. 1262) states that, “in a global historical view, the perfect fit between 
the mathematical concept of a fixed point and the social science concept of an equilibrium 
stands out”, it can be said that this perfect fit was possible only because, previously, anything 
that could hinder it was modified or removed.  
Mentioning this way of proceeding could be considered important in the sense that it 
shows the alteration in the relation between mathematical means and theoretical ends. But it is 
not the basis of this paper’s argument. For, on the one hand, the appraisal of a model should not 
be based on the intentions on which it was built, and, on the other hand, interpretative questions 
are this paper’s main concern. Accordingly, the problem lies in the fact that the result of the 
described way of proceeding was a mathematically correct PEGE which, nevertheless, cannot 
be interpreted in a coherent way -not even by making use of fictitious agents such as the 
Walrasian auctioneer and the market participant. 
The mathematical analysis of economic problems is a methodological option which 
makes it possible to satisfy desirable scientific values to a greater extent, such as precision or 
transparency -in the sense that, for example, all the assumptions leading to a result have to be 
laid carefully. However, this does not imply that the application of mathematical techniques to 
economics can be carried out anyhow and independently of its costs. In this sense, the main 
conclusion which stems from the preceding discussion is that the condition that formal structure 
and interpretation are closely linked is a minimum requirement which could underpin the 
usefulness of economic models -whether usefulness is understood according to Hausman, 
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Gibbard and Varian, or Sugden. Moreover, despite Debreu’s claim in the preface of Theory of 
Value, formal structure should be a means to express economic content. 
Against Samuelson’s (1947, p. 6) statement that “the laborious literary working over of 
essentially simple mathematical concepts ... is ... not only unrewarding from the standpoint of 
advancing the science, but involves as well mental gymnastics of a peculiar depraved type”, the 
opposite could be asserted. To say it in Rosser’s words (2003, p. 586), “equations are here to 
stay”, but increasing “the ratio of words to equations” would be desirable. In this regard, note 
that one of the tasks, among others, fulfilled by economic formal models is the communication 
of economic knowledge. However, as regards those models whose formal structure is not 
coherently interpretable, there is considerable room for improvement in the way they carry out 
this task. 
Considering the significance of AD’s (1954) model in the development of mathematical 
economics, the fact that it violates the minimum methodological requirement of linking verbal 
and formal content is in itself of some concern. However, the hermeneutic problems attached to 
this model are just an example of a situation which has certain legitimacy among -or, at least, it 
is not rejected by- mathematical economists; namely, that theoretical contributions may not only 
lack relevance, but also, as far as a formal element helps to build a mathematical proof, there is 
no need for it to be interpretable. Given this situation and its consequences, demanding that 
formal structures must be interpretable and that the use of mathematics should be conditioned 
by the economic content which we want to express are requirements which can be easily 
satisfied, but could help to improve the acceptability of the scientific results which the 
mathematization of economics produces. For satisfying these conditions would imply that we 
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